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The salient symptoms were: In eight cases, confusion; in two cases, emotional instability; in one case, sleeplessness.
Lymphocyto8is.-In routine laboratory work we have generally to be content with the examination of blood films, following them up with a full count when indicated. The most useful figure here is the lymphocyte count.
A lymphocytosis is absolute or relative. It used to be taught that a polymorphonuclear leucocytosis implied an acute infection except in certain established cases, such as typhoid fever, measles, influenza, etc.
An absolute lymphocytosis implied some chronic infection; relative lymphocytosis implied a polymorphonuclear leucopEenia, as in Addison's aniemia.
It is now considered that a lymphocytosis is not an indication of chronicity, but rather of repair, implying that an infection is being resisted; post-infective lymphocytosis is now well recognized.
Let us now consider how a differential count may help us in elucidating physical factors in mental disease. ' I have taken 100 consecutive cases all seen in private practice. Ten had a relative lymphocytosis of over 50%. Seventeen had a relative lymphocytosis'+of 40 to 50%. The ten cases with a lymphocytosis of over 50% proved, on further investigation, to be cases of: (1) Suppurating gall-bladder; (2) suppurating maxillary antrum; (3) chronic appendix abscess; (4) septic''abortion; (5) tonsillitis; (6) obscure enteritis; (7) pituitary tumour; (8) asthma; (9) tetany; (10) intestinal stasis.
The 17 cases with from 40 to 50% lymphocytes: Cholecystitis two; dental sepsis two; tonsillitis two; chronic appendicitis one; unresolved pneumonia one; asthma two; B. coli cystitis two; endocarditis one; old syphilis one; renal disease one; colitis two.
In two cases a low relative lymphocyte count drew attention to a neutrophile leucocytosis, with an acute infection. One interesting feature is the result of agglutination tests. Sometimes when a septic focus cannot be found, agglutination tests may give an indication. In nine cases of the 100 a specific agglutination was given to some organism.
In every one of these cases the lymphocyte count was only slightly raised. Antrum infection, two cases, 44%, 21% lymphocytes. Arthritis and rheumatism four cases, 25%, 34°h, 29%, 34%. Paratyphoid A, one case, 28%. Endocarditis, one case, 40%. Disseminated sclerosis, one case, 33%.
The Physiological Basis of the Neuroses. By W. Ross ASHBY, M.B.
ABSTRACT.-In many ways in physiology and psychology one sees evidences of " patterns." Sensory stimuli are usually received as a pattern and most motor responses take the form of a clear-cut pattern of movements. The majority of the reactions in the central nervous system are concerned with pattern8 of impulses rather than a single nerve impulse.
It is suggested that when two patterns meet, the interaction is subject to two definite laws:-(1) Similar patterns integrate and beconme one pattern, the differences between them building up to a new pattern. (2) Dissimilar patterns are dealt with by the complete acceptance or establishment of one pattern and the total rejection of the other. Examples are given to illustrate these two laws. It is suggested that whether two patterns are treated as similar or dissimilar will depend on: (1) The nature of the patterns themselves and; (2) the state or type of the nervous system.
It is suggested that in the neuroses, what is really happening is that the person is treating as dissimilar certain patterns which are usually considered to be similar.
Clinical applications are discussed. This paper really follows as a development of ideas put forward by MacCurdy in his book "Common Principles in Psychology and Physiology." MacCurdy has come to the conclusion that the only way to combine physiology and psychology is to work, not in terms of impulses, or synapse resistances, etc., but in terms of "patterns." He calls them "images " and " patterns," apparently using the words as equivalent.
He finds that the same basic properties of patterns are shown both in psychology and in physiology. He finds that patterns in various forms occur freely in both sciences and he concludes that exactly the same basic rules hold good in both spheres.
MacCurdy's considerations of patterns were of great interest to me, as I had already and independently come to somewhat similar conclusions. In this paper I propose to accept his general outline and to attempt to develop his ideas a stage further. I hope to show that if MacCurdy's ideas are extended we shall find that the neuroses fall quite naturally into their place in the scheme. MacCurdy is, I think, deliberately vague in his definitions of images or patterns, preferring to leave the concept to the reader's general understanding rather than to tie the concept down too rigidly by definition.
I will commence by giving some illustrations of the way in which the idea of " patterns" may be used in psychology.
Firstly, the Gestalt psychologists have shown clearly that ordinary sensory data are by no means a mere mass of isolated point stimuli. On the contrary, it appears that under all ordinary conditions, the sensory data always present themselves essentially as patterns which have unity and interconnections. Thus, in reading, each word is essentially a pattern of black on white. It is not a mere jumble of black particles on white. It is the pattern formed that counts. Equally a word is not the same as a jumble of letters. The letters must form a particular pattern to be of any use. Thus, if we take the word " veil," and if we arrange the letters in varying orders, we get "VILE," "LIVP3," "VEIL," "EVIL,s" "LEVI."' These words contain the same four letters but they are read quite differently. Consequently, in reading we are not reacting simply to the letters E, I, L, and V, but we are reacting to the pattern formed by them.
Equally in hearing speech, we are dealing with patterns of sound. hlere again, it is the pattern which counts. The loudness or pitch of the voice counts little. We can understand people who speak in a deep gruff voice and also if they have a high squeaky voice. But if they are to be understood, they must produce the right pattern of sound.
In vision, at least, practically all our data is given to us in the form of patterns. In hearing, we deal largely with patterns of sound. At a further stage of the process, these sensory patterns are built up into larger and more comprehensive patterns as when we are "c onversing " with someone. We see the person moving his lips and see his expression and also hear the patterns of sound which he is producing. Equally, from this conversation, still further patterns are produced when we have listened for some time, and have had built up in our mind the pattern which the speaker has been trying to construct.
Similarly, at the other end of the process we have muscular movements, which, it should be noticed, appear normally as patterns. A person in convulsions is producing movements which are almost patternless, but any useful movement must be adjusted to produce a definite pattern. In making a drive at golf, for instance, a very particular pattern of movement must be produced in order to get a good drive. In speaking, too, we must produce very precise patterns of movements of our tongue, etc., in order to produce the patterns of sound which we want. Further examples would be mere repetition, but in any case it is clear that the concept of patterns is capable of wide extension in psychology, as has been suggested by MacCurdy.
Here I propose to maintain that these patterns have certain general properties, which will apply to all patterns equally. I submit that all patterns follow two general rules, and that these two rules apply to patterns both in psychology and in physiology. The rules deal with the interactions of patterns with one another and are as follows:
(1) Nearly similar patterns will always fuse into one another as far as possible, so as to give one pattern, made by combining the common parts of the two, and the small differences between them, if systematic, will give rise to a further, and brand-new pattern.
(2) Dissimilar patterns will not fuse, but will struggle, one with the other, without combining, and one of the two will be obliterated.
What evidence is there on the subject ? Let us take the first principle. I have tried to find an examnple which I can demonstrate. I have only found one, which is illustrated in the accompanying figure. Here we have two simple patterns which are certainly similar ( fig. 1 ). At the same time there is a slight systematic difference, since in one, the bars are slightly closer together than the other. When we combine them by superimposing them we get a different pattern ( fig. 2 ). As we have suggested before, the steady systematic differences have formed a new pattern, which is beginning to show a brand new feature, namely a wave-like appearance of alternate dark and light. We see that the two original patterns, when combined, have given us one pattern as far as the common elements are concerned, i.e., the final pattern is still a rectangle, and has bars across it, while the slight systematic difference of spacing has given rise to a brand new pattern of waves. What examples are there in physiology? Now in vision, we find this rule very clearly substantiated. If we look at a very distant object, each eye receives practically the same image or pattern. But these two patterns, in practice, always fuse so that the final result is that we see, not two equal patterns, one for each eye, but simply one pattern, which is the landscape we are looking at. The two patterns have fused completely. If now we look at closer objects, the two patterns are nearly the samlie, but not quite, since binocular vision introduces a stereoscopic effect.
Further, these differences between the two patterns are systematic, in that the amount of difference is proportional to the reciprocal of the distance. Consequently, according to the rule, we would expect the two patterns to fuse as far as their common elements are concerned, and this is found, since again we see only one object although, each eye contributes its pattern, while at the same time, the differences, being systematic, produce a brand new pattern, which is the concept of "distance." In vision, therefore, we find very obvious confirmation of the rule.
In hearing, we find that if the source of sound is in the sagittal plane, the pattern heard by each ear is identical, and we hear just one sound. But if the source is on one side, then the two patterns are nearly similar, but there is a difference, and this difference, being systematic, in that it agrees with visual experience, builds up the new concept of "direction."
In the case of taste uniformly distributed over the tongue, again we find that the many impressions from the taste buds, being identical, are fused into one impression of taste.
A similar phenomenon is seen in the spinal reflexes when two nerves, producing the same effect separately, are stimulated together. We find, not the sum of the two separate results, but merely a slight increase of the single response. The two patterns of stimulation being nearly identical, have produced only a little more than the result of one of them. The two stimulations, of course, cannot be made precisely identical, since one has to use two nerves.
If we turn to more complex patterns, we find the same rule to apply. Suppose I were to begin saying " To-night is cold, to-night is cold, to-night is cold . . . " and so on for twenty times, and were then to ask what I had said. you would probably reply that I had said "To-night is cold " and you would probably add that I had repeated it twenty times. Here we have twenty patterns of sound, all identical in form, but differing systematically in that some were said before others. The final result is that all twenty are grouped together in your mind as far as their common content is concerned, while the differences, being systematic, build up the new idea of " repetition." Thus we see as before, that the presentation of a number of patterns, nearly identical, leads to a fusing of all the conmmon elements, together with the development of a new concept or pattern.
I will give one more example. Suppose I am walking in the country and wanlt to get to London. I come to a cross-roads. I see a sign-post which says " To London " and points to the right. I ask a bystander and he says " Turn right." I then look at the map and see I must turn to the right. Here I have been subjected to three stimulus patterns, each of which, by itself, would arouse the motor pattern of turning to the right. What actually happens? Do I turn to the right three times ? Do I turn to the right with three times the muscular violence ? Of course not. To another observer my motor behaviour is the same as if I had been subjected to only one of the stimulating patterns. The three motor patterns being identical, simply fuse to become one pattern.
To conclude the first part, we find, then, that many examples show the same rule with regard to what happens when two or more similar patterns are activated in the nervous system. We find that the patterns fuse and form just one pattern, which is composed of the common elements, and that the differences, if systematic, go to build up a brand new pattern.
We will now turn to the question of what happens if two very different patterns are brought together. We might think at first sight that the nervous system would fit them together as best it could and that it would have to be satisfied with the very muddled pattern resulting. Actually, however, something quite different seems to occur. Suppose we try a simple experiment. We look down a microscope keeping both eyes open, so that one eye sees the field of the microscope, while the other eye sees the table. An unpractised person sees each field of view alternating with the other. First one sees the mnicroscope field -completely, then suddenly it vanishes and one can see nothing except the table, and so on.
We find, therefore, that when two incompatible patterns are presented, or stimulated together, what happens is that one pattern appears completely, while the other is completely suppressed.
Another example is given in vision when we examine a person suffering from chronic strabismus. Since the axes of the eyes are not parallel, the pattern presented by one eye will be shifted over the pattern presented by the other. When shifted in this way the two patterns become incompatible. In such cases, as is well known, one eye becomes functionally blind. Now this is an amazingly clever thing for the visual cortex to do. It should be noted that it is not an inhibition of one side of the visual cortex, since this would produce a hemianopia. Both sides of the brain receive both patterns, and they then pick out entirely the elements coming from one eye, and reject entirely the elements coming from the other eye. How it is done is, I think, a complete mystery, but we are not concerned with that here. The fact remains that, when two incompatible patterns are presented, one is rejected while the other is accepted.
The same sort of behaviour is shown well in the spinal reflexes. As is well known, if two incompatible reflexes are stimulated together, we do not get a muddle of both of them, but instead, a complete suppression of one, and a complete expression of the other. One is rather reminded of a see-saw, with a reflex at each end so that only one can be " up " at any one moment.
Again, we see the same sort of thing in conditioned responses. If a dog is conditioned to salivate at a high note, and not to salivate at a low note, and if then we sound a note in between them, this note will stimulate both the excitatory and the inhibitory responses at, the same time. The dog then shows signs of acute conflict, but the interesting point is, as Pavlov has noted, that the result is always either copious salivation or none whatsoever, never slight salivation. That is to say, the dog always goes to one extreme or the other. Here again we see that when two incompatible patterns are stimulated together, we get full expression of one and total suppression of the other, never a half-way result.
When we come to deal with the more complex patterns involved in the concepts of "personality," " character," etc., we find much the same state of affairs. In dealing with cases of multiple personality, Morton Prince shows clearly how the various personalities in one patient are incompatible with one another. The interesting part from our point of view, is that these personalities, when brought out by hypnosis, show just the same features as before, namely, that as soon as one comes into the field, the others automatically disappear.
One is reminded again of the see-saw.
Finally, when we come to ordinary behaviour, we find that this rule covers a large amount of our activities. Suppose, for instance, that it is a fine afternoon and one is not sure whether to play golf or tennis. It is quite clear that whatever one does, we shall not go to the tennis court in plus fours. The two patterns of behaviour, being incompatible, do not mix into a muddled half-way pattern. Whatever I do, it would be either one or the other, but not a half-way mixture. Again, if I arrived at tea both hungry and thirsty, and wanting both to eat and to drink, I would not take a cup of tea and then try to bite a piece out of it.
Obviously with a little ingenuity one could multiply such examples indefinitely. But in every case we find that when two incompatible lines of behaviour are activated, we get either one or the other.
To recapitulate, we found first that similar patterns are integrated into one another to give one pattern. We then found that dissimilar or incompatible patterns are dealt with by the nervous system which accepts one and rejects the other. Further, the examples have shown that these two laws hold good over a very wide range in the central nervous system. It is possible that they may represent really basic laws of the nervous system.
Well then, where do the neuroses come in this scheme? It is fairly clear after these remarks, that some of the main features of the neuroses are due to the fact that the person has in him two sets of behaviour patterns which just will not fit. The result, in accordance with our rules, is a more or less complete suppression of one set. We may, if we like, call one the unconscious and the other the super-ego, but that is immaterial. The essential point is that the person has two sets of behaviour-patterns which will not fit into one another. On the one hand, there are the primitive instinctual patterns, more or less complete in themselves, and on the other there are the larger behaviour patterns concerning family and social pressure which demand equally that only certain behaviour patterns are permissible. In the normal person, these two sets of patterns are fairly similar, so that they are dealt with by rule 1--" that similar patterns shall integrate," and in the normal person these instinctual and social patterns are integrated together to produce the normal adult, whose behaviour corresponds to a good solid integration of all the patterns concerned, so that both instinctual and social demands are satisfied. The neurotic, then, is essentially a person who, having these two sets of patterns to deal with, treats them byrule 2, i.e., by suppressing one of them, instead of following rule 1, i.e., integrating them. The point which I want to make is that the basic feature of the neurotic, namely repression, is not specialized and isolated and " abnormal," but is a feature which can be observed quite generally all over the nervous system. The neurotic suppresses one pattern. But we saw that the rule about suppressing one pattern can be observed in vision, in strabismus, in the spinal reflexes, in the conditioned responses and in ordinary, strictly normal behaviour. But this might make it appear as though the neurotic is as normal as the ordinary person. Clearly the neurotic cannot be considered entirely normal. What is he then, norml1 or abnormal? I think the answer is something like this:
Each person after birth has two sets of patterns to deal with, the instinctive and the social. As we have seen, there are two ways in which they may be dealt with, the two patterns may be integrated or one of them may be suppressed. Each of these two ways must be considered to be perfectly normal. Now the normal person says, so to speak, "these two patterns seem to me to be fairly similar so I will integrate them." The neurotic on the other hand says, so to speak, " these two patterns seem to me to be dissimilar so I will suppress one." In other words, the neurotic is abnormal, not because he chooses an abnormal method, but because he chooses rule 2 for dealing with the patterns, whereas the bulk of us use rule 1. The neurotic, therefore, is not really abnormal-he is unusual, he is out of the fashion.
It will be seen that the question now becomes " Wby does the neurotic find his two sets of patterns dissimilar ? " Now here, it should be noted, absolute values are of no use. We are not discussing whether the two patterns, the instinctual and the environmental, are similar or not-we are noticing whether a particular person considers them to be similar. Consequently the person's reaction to them will depend partly on the patterns themselves, and partly on the nature of the person. This point of view is, I think, closer to the truth since it fixes the onus of neurosis equally on the person and his environment. Unfortunately, too many schools have thrown the onus entirely on to one or the other. Some think the neurotic is entirely the product of an infantile experience, and say that the person is neurotic because of an event or events which happened to him. Others go to the opposite extreme and maintain that he is a neurotic of his own nature. I maintain that both are right-that the neurosis is a product of the individual and his environment. It seems to me to be rather like carrying a load. Whether a person can carry a given load or not depends equally upon the weight of the load and upon the muscular strength of the person. One cannot say that all people who cannot carry their loads are abnormal-their loads may be too heavy. Equally the loads are not everything, since in some cases the people may be muscularly weak. It is not the weight of the loads, or the strength, which counts; it is the relation between them.
Another analogy is the question of obstructed labour in childbirth. What counts here is not the absolute size of the fcetal head, or the size of the pelvic outlet, but the relation between them.
In the same way, the child, faced with his instinctual and environmental patterns, will harmonize them or not according to (1) how similar they happen to be, and (2) his power of harmonizing or integrating.
So I would suggest that the setiology of neurosis may be approached from the following point of view: The higher material of mind may be considered as equivalent to patterns. Further, the interaction of patterns always takes place subject to two rules which reign quite uniformly from the highest activities of the mind down to the simplest spinal reflexes. If the person's integrating powers are sufficient to enable him to integrate two given patterns, then they are dealt with by rule 1. If the person's integrating powers are insufficient for the particular patterns in hand, then rule 2 is used. Further, I would suggest that instinct and environment are equivalent to patterns. In the nature of things, there must always be some discrepancy between these two. If the discrepancy is greater than the person's integrating powers can manage, then they are dealt with by rule 2, and the person is considered clinically to be neurotic.
All the above, however, sounds " very much up in the air," and it needs justifying. In what way is it likely to be of use ?
Although these ideas are highly theoretical, yet I think the theory may claim a hearing because it unifies a number of different ideas and brings, perhaps, some clearness where there has certainly been some confusion. Firstly, it brings the question of neurosis right down to physiology. It attempts to show that exactly the same principles hold good from the lowest reflex to the most complicated activities. There is no doubt that psychology, in its recent advances, has tended to become rather isolated and aloof from the other sciences.
And yet it must be clear that psychology is really only a particular branch of physiology. It may be very complicated, and will probably always remain a special branch, but none the less, it must ultimately submit to being reduced to physiology, just as the latter, in its turn, can be reduced to physics and chemistry. In this paper I have attempted to show, if we admit the concept of patterns, that there is a complete grading of the facts, from the simplest to the most complex, from simple physiology up to the more complex psychology. The theory, then, has this advantage, that it emphasizes and recognizes the essential unity of the two branches.
A second advantage is that it recognizes and emphasizes the fact that we do not react to unit stimuli or to single nerve impulses. We always react to complete situations or patterns. The older psychologists were apt to consider that we reacted to a stimulus. This I believe to be totally wrong. Suppose we take an example. I am here reading. What is the stimulus to which I am reacting? The older psychologists would have said " To the print." But this is assuredly not so. I have seen this print several times before but I did not at once get up and start reading it every time I saw it. Clearly I am also reacting to the fact that I am in this room. But I have been in this room earlier without reading the paper. Clearly I am also reacting to the time. But had I been here at 9.30 last night I should not have begun to read it. I am also, therefore, reacting to the fact that it is Tuesday, May the ninth. There are probably still further factors, but at any rate it is clear that I am not reacting only to the print-I am reacting to the whole situation, to the complete pattern of stimuli of time, place, print, date and so on. Clearly, people react to the situation as a whole. That is to say, they react to a complete pattern. I would suggest that the above line of approach to the subject of neurosis is more correct because it accepts this and deals, not with how people react to a unit stimulus, but how they react to patterns.
Incidentally, it must be obvious that this approach to the subject of neurosis is essentially that of the Gestalt psychologist. The theory may, perhaps, claim the advantage of introducing Gestalt principles to psychiatry.
Finally, there is one other more practical point which I would like to mention. According to the views expressed above, the neurotic is essentially like a porter who cannot lift a trunk. There is disproportion between the weight of the load and the strength of the porter. Similarly the neurotic is a person who cannot integrate two patterns. The person's integrating powers are too weak to reconcile the differences between the patterns. Can we test this experimentally? Now, at present, we have no means of measuring patterns or their similarities. But if what I have suggested is true-namely, that this combining activity is essentially the same from spinal reflexes, through vision, conditioned responses, and so on, up to the most complex behaviour, then it should be possible and justifiable to measure the integrating capacity at the lower levels and in that way to obtain some idea of the integrating capacity at the higher levels.
To summarize finally: As human beings, we react always to patterns. And we react to patterns of stimuli by producing patterns of movement. From this point of view, patterns become the essential content of the mind and brain. I have suggested that these patterns are dealt with by fixed rules. In particular we have considered what happens when two patterns are activated which would each use the same "final common path." There are two rules: (1) Similar patterns are integrated to form one pattern; (2) dissimilar patterns produce conflict resulting in the expression of one and the suppression of the other.
The child bas two main facts to deal with, its instincts and its environment, and these two facts may be considered as patterns. If the environment is very dissimilar or conflicting with its instincts, or if the child has poor integrating powers, then it finds them dissimilar and reacts by rule 2. It is then described as " neurotic." But it is emphasized that this is really quite physiological. A neurosis is abnormal only because it is unusual.
Discussion.-Dr. CLIFFORD ALLEN: I should like to criticize Dr. Ross Ashby's interesting paper, inasmuch as it is, like all the configurational psychology, purely descriptive. It tells us absolutely nothing new. The configurational school of psychology takes a perfectly commonplace phenomenon-such as the formation of a row of dots to make a line-and describes this in mysterious terms. This school does not tell us the mental mechanism involved in making a row of dots form the line, but this is what we want to know.
Dr. Ross Ashby has given us Freud in terms of the Gestalt school, but whether we call complexes " patterns " or any other name does not make our work any easier. We shall still have to spend hours of work uncovering and " digging out " these patterns. What we need is not a new name but a new method whereby we can uncover the patterns or complexes without hours of apparently wasted toil.
Dr. A. T. WILSON said that he welcomed Dr. Ross Ashby's paper as an attempt to elaborate, using MacCurdy's " pattern " nomenclature, a practical bypothesis regarding neuroses. A great volume of physiological research was at present being done in various psychiatric institutions, and it was important to realize the general agreement among physiologists that mechanical neurophysiology was unable to explain the relatively simple phenomena of the " spinal reflex arc," far less those of the complete organism. One of the most valuable points of the pattern hypothesis lay in the fact that it provided a common language for discussion between physiologists and psychologists. Not least, it was in line with the present apparently definite monistic trend of philosophy.
